Space Warfare in the Here and Now: The Rules of Engagement for U.S. Weaponized Satellites in the Current Legal Space Regime by Crockett, Jameson W.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 77 | Issue 4 Article 1
2012
Space Warfare in the Here and Now: The Rules of
Engagement for U.S. Weaponized Satellites in the
Current Legal Space Regime
Jameson W. Crockett
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jameson W. Crockett, Space Warfare in the Here and Now: The Rules of Engagement for U.S. Weaponized Satellites in the Current Legal
Space Regime, 77 J. Air L. & Com. 671 (2012)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol77/iss4/1
SPACE WARFARE IN THE HERE AND NOW: THE RULES
OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S. WEAPONIZED SATELLITES
IN THE CURRENT LEGAL SPACE REGIME
JAMESON W. CROCKETT*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 672
II. ANTI-SATELLITE TECHNOLOGIES .............. 674
A. LASER ASATs ................................... 674
B. KINETIC ENERGY ASATs ......................... 677
C. NUCLEAR AND ELECTROMAGNETIC ASATs ....... 679
D. RADIO FREQUENCY ASATs ...................... 680
E. PARTICLE BEAM ASATs ......................... 681
F. MICROSAT AND NANOSAT ASATs ................ 682
III. SPACE LAW TREATIES AND ARTICLE 51 OF
THE UNITED NATIONS' CHARTER .............. 683
A. THE RELEVANCE OF THE ICJ IN SPACE LAw
A NALYSIS ........................................ 683
B. THE OUTER SPACE T ATY ...................... 684
C. THE LIABILITY CONVENTION .................... 688
D. THE RESCUE AND RETURN AGREEMENT .......... 688
E. THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION ............... 689
F. THE MOON TREATY ............................. 689
G. U.N. CHARTER ARTICLE 51 ..................... 690
IV. HISTORY OF THE LAW OF THE SEA ............ 691
V. HOW THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
COULD BE APPLIED TO SPACE ................. 693
VI. HOW TO CREATE A SPACE REGIME FOR SPACE
SATELLITES ....................................... 696
A. THE DEFINITION OF SHIPS UNDER THE LAW OF
THE SEA CONVENTION .......................... 696
B. THE SWORDFISH CASES AND THE SPACE COURT.. 697
VII. CONCLUSION ..................................... 699
* Jameson Crockett received his J.D. from the University of New Hampshire
School of Law (formerly known as Franklin Pierce Law Center) in 2009.
671
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AMD COMMERCE
I. INTRODUCTION
E VER SINCE the Global Positioning System (GPS) gave
American forces greater speed and accuracy against Iraqi
targets in the 1991 Persian Gulf War,1 satellites have been one of
the U.S. military's most important components because of their
crucial role in facilitating overall strategy. 2 However, other
countries have turned their eyes upward too. -On January 23,
2007, China announced to the world that it had destroyed a
Feng Yun 1C polar orbit weather satellite with a ground-based
missile. The test was seen by countries in the Pacific region as
the beginning of a space arms race, despite a statement by the
Chinese Foreign Ministry stating otherwise.4
From the Persian Gulf War onward, China has witnessed the
United States' reliance on space-based operations to coordinate
its military and has begun to fear that U.S. superiority in this
field would stiffen Taiwan's resolve against unification with the
mainland and diminish China's military strike capability.5 In re-
sponse to this, China has poured enormous amounts of money
and manpower into its anti-satellite weapons (ASATs) program
and characterized the U.S. military's strategic capabilities as
weak, as in a report published by the state-run news agency enti-
tled "The US Military's Soft Ribs and Strategic Weakness."6
China spared no expense by increasing its total defense spend-
ing from $17 billion in 2001 to $78 billion in 2010, as it now
seeks to deter U.S. nuclear weapons, counter U.S. conventional
forces, and gain more power in Asia.7 To counter this, the U.S.
Department of Defense has requested $1.6 billion from fiscal
yeai 2003-2007 for ASAT techhology alone.8
Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in
Space, 48 A.F. L. REx'. 1, 17 (2000).
2 See Andrew T. Park, Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need for a
New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space, 28 Hous. J. INT'L L. 871,
873 (2006).
3 China Confirms Satellite Downed, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2007, 10:52 AM), http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6289519.stm.
4 Id. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Liu Jianchao, declared
that "China has never, and will never, participate in any form of space arms race."
Id.
5 Id.; Major RichardJ. Adams & Colonel Martin E. France, The Chinese Threat to
U.S. Space Superiority, I HIGH FRONTIER 17, 18 (2005).
6 Adams & France, supra note 5, at 17-18.
7 Amol Sharma et al., Asia's New Arms Race, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2011, at CL.
8 Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-
Based Regime for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 363, 366 (2004). What is even
672
20121 WEAPONIZED SATELLITES 673
The time is rapidly approaching when the next series of con-
flicts will not be confined to Earth, but high above in space. Ad-
ditionally, the Chinese satellite destruction test highlights the
need for a rule-based convention for space to replace the cur-
rent space law regime. Many people think that the Law of the
Sea Convention should be used as a basis for a rule-based re-
gime in space; however, space satellites present a definitional
problem because they are not personally manned.9 Equally as
daunting is the infancy of space law and lack of clarification with
respect to developing types of technologies, with no clear pic-
ture of what can legally be used and how."°
This article focuses on whether the U.S. military can legally
weaponize its satellites in space under the current space law re-
gime, and whether its satellites would fit into the Law of the Sea
analogy. Only military and spy satellites in relation to Earth will
be discussed. Part II centers on ASATs that are space-based or
ground-based, regardless of the current technical feasibility of
such ideas. Part III focuses on the legality of weaponized satel-
lites within the five treaties that make up space law: (1) the
Outer Space Treaty; (2) the Liability Convention; (3) the Res-
cue and Return Agreement; (4) the Registration Convention;
and (5) the Moon Treaty. 1 An important underlying factor to
space law is found in Article 51 of the United Nations (U.N.)
Charter, which gives all states the right to self-defense, a princi-
ple that is the very reason for military involvement in space.' 2
more telling is that this ASAT funding was only for space-based lasers and kinetic
kill vehicles. Id.
9 See infra Part IV.
10 Michel Bourbonni&e, Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and the Neutralisation of
Satellites or lus In Bello Satellitis, 9 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 43, 69 (2004).
11 See Ramey, supra note 1, at 65. The United States is a party to all of these
treaties except the Moon Treaty. This is because of business concerns over Moon
exploitation rights. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer
Space Treaty]; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Lia-
bility Convention]; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astro-
nauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19
U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement]; Con-
vention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]; Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec.
18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
12 See U.N. Charter art. 51.
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Part IV briefly traces the historical development of the law of
the high seas from Hugo Grotius to the implementation of the
1982 Law of the Sea Convention.13 Part V examines where space
satellites would fit into this convention if it were applied to outer
space. It also addresses the creation of various levels of space,
similar to the four types of sea zones under the Law of the Sea
Convention, and the potential problems with it. Part VI analyzes
whether a solution can be found either by analogizing the status
of satellites to the status of "warships" at sea or by creating an
adjudicative body, similar to how the International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea was created to deal with the Swordfish Cases.14
Besides trying to lay out the rules of engagement under the
current space law regime, this article concludes that the Law of
the Sea Convention cannot be applied to space in its current
form because satellites would enjoy an exempt status in space,
much like warships do at sea. The solution to preventing battles
in space is to create a space court with mandatory jurisdiction,
in conjunction with applying a convention like the Law of the
Sea Convention that is reconfigured for space. However, until
such a space court and convention are created, the U.S. military
must operate within the current space law regime.
II. ANTI-SATELLITE TECHNOLOGIES
A. LASER ASATs
One option for possible ASAT technology is the laser. This
dream of the "Star Wars" generation from the 1980s is very
much a possibility today, and not just by the United States. 11
The Star Wars program envisioned using a three-pronged de-
fense system of lasers composed of ground-, air-, and space-
based elements. The Department of Defense's Laser Master
Plan in 2000 also stated three goals for military lasers:
(1) "Ability to address high speed and highly maneuverable
targets";
13 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10. 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention].
14 See Ian Bezpalko, The Deep Seabed: Customary Law Codified, 44 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 867, 885-900 (2004).
15 This is a reference to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, a pro-
gram that was designed to protect the United States from nuclear missile attacks
with ground-, air-, and space-based anti-missile defense systems. See American Expe-
rience: Foreign Affairs: Reagan, PBS, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperi-
ence/features/general-article/reagan-foreign/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2012).
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(2) "Ability to deliver lethality at the speed of light- [t] argets
requiring short reaction time (compressed battlefield applica-
tions)"; and
(3) "Ability to produce graduated thermal effects-[I]ess than
lethal applications. 16
On October 17, 1997, the United States successfully tested a
ground-based laser (GBL), called the Mid Infrared Advanced
Chemical Laser (MIRACL), against a government satellite. 17
The U.S. Army tested "beams of varying durations ([one] sec-
ond and [ten] seconds), simulating both an inadvertent lasing
and a hostile attack on a satellite."' 8 While it was only a partial
success because the target satellite "failed to download data dur-
ing the lase," one can only imagine how far testing has
progressed since then in the post-September 11th atmosphere."9
Lasers have become a central and successful tool for China's
ASAT program. In September 2007, the Chinese shot a laser
that blinded a U.S. spy satellite.2 ° This was achieved by using a
low-powered, ground-based laser to spread just enough radia-
tion over the satellite's electro-optical sensors to blind it.2 '
Another laser that combines both space- and ground-based
components is the free-electron laser. This laser is generated on
16 DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT OF THE HIGH ENERGY LASER EXECUTIVE REVIEW PANEL:
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LASER MASTER PLAN 5 (2000), available at http://www.
fas.org/spp/starwars/program/laser-review.pdf.
17 Sami Fournier, U.S. Test-Fires "MIRA CL " at Satellite Reigniting ASA T Weapons
Debate, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Oct. 1997, available at http://www.armscontroL.
org/act/ 1997_1 0/miracloct.asp.
18 Id.
19 Id. Fournier's article was written in 1997. Many things have changed over
the past ten years. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 (ABM Treaty) be-
tween the United States and Russia prohibited a space-based missile defense sys-
tem, including lasers. Manuel Perez-Rivas, U.S. Quits ABM Treaty, CNN (Dec. 14,
2001), http://archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/12/13/rec.bush.abm/.
This ended on December 13, 2001, when President Bush announced that the
United States was pulling out of the ABM Treaty. Id. Prompted by the new
threat of "future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks" and the diminished
threat of a democratic and friendly Russia, the United States withdrew, and it was
free to move forward and continue testing the MIRACL laser from ground-based
positions and space-based platforms without violating any treaties. See id.
20 Analysts Say U.S. Working on Array of Satellite Defenses, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 11,
2007), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/03/11/2003351
785.
21 ToM WILSON, COMM'N TO ACCESS U.S. NAT'L SEC. SPACE MGMT. & ORG.,
THREATS TO UNITED STATES SPACE CAPABILITIES 18 (2000), available at http://
www.globalsecurity.org/space/ library/report/200 1 /nssmo/article05.pdf (pre-
pared for the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Man-
agement and Organization).
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the ground and beamed into space, where it is reflected off orbi-
tal mirrors on satellites and then redirected against ground
targets. 2
2
A more well-known laser is the airborne laser (ABL). 3 It was
designed to be used as part of the missile defense program
under the Strategic Defense Initiative, but it can also be used to
shoot down satellites. 24 The ABL is mounted on the nose of a
modified Boeing 747-400 aircraft flying over friendly airspace
and is designed to fire a "chemical oxygen iodine laser" at "bal-
listic missiles in the early boost-phase. ' 25 One of the drawbacks
to using the ABL is its targeting because atmospheric turbulence
causes the beam to bend and the "laser's optical system" to expe-
rience a "distorting effect. 26
Space-based laser (SBL) satellites offer the chance to shoot
enemy satellite targets from space without the ABL's beam-
bending problem.2 7 SBLs use "sustained laser burst[s]" from a
hydrogen fluoride chemical reaction. 2  Additionally, the SBL-
generated beam requires a shorter burn time to break through
the casing of an incoming missile or enemy satellite, thereby in-
creasing the chances of shooting down an enemy target.29
22 Ramey, supra note 1, at 24 n.98.
23 See Airborne Laser, FED'N Am. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/
program/abl.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012); see also Ramey, supra note 1, at 25.
24 Ramey, supra note 1, at 23-25.
25 SIMON COLLARD-WEXLER ET AL., SPACE SEC. INDEX, SPACE SECURITY 2004 129
(2004), available at http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2004.pdf. "This technology
is also assessed to have ASAT capabilities." Id.; see also Airborne Laser, supra note 23
(stating that while its "infrared wavelength of 1.315 microns" would render the
laser "invisible to the naked eye," it would still be deadly).
26 Nathan Hodge, Pentagon Loses War ta Zap Airborne Laser from Budget, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 11, 2011, at A10. Atmospheric turbulence occurs when there are water
molecules in the air and there are variations in air temperature between the air-
craft and the target. Id.
27 See Space Based Laser, FED'N OF Am. SCIENTISTS, http://wwvw.fas.org/spp/star
wars/program/sbl.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
28 Id.
29 Bruce M. DeBlois et al., Star-Crossed: From Orbiting Lasers to Microsatellite Mines
to Heavy Metal Rods That Strike from the Heavens, The Potential to Wage War from Space
Raises Startling Possibilities-and Serious Problems, INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS
ENGINEERS (IEEE) SPECTRUM, Mar. 2005, at 5, available at http://www.princeton.
edu/-rskemp/IEEE%2Spectrum%20-%2OStar%2OCrossed.pdf. Bruce DeBlois
and the other authors had all worked at the Council on Foreign Relations. Id. at
11. They note that
[flor example, to attack a ballistic missile, a space-based 3-MW laser
with a 3-meter diameter mirror stationed 1000 kilometers above
Earth's surface, in low-Earth orbit (LEO), requires an impractical 2
hours and 13 minutes to burn through the rocket casing at a range
676
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B. KINETIC ENERGY ASATs
Kinetic energy (KE) ASATs are launched weapons with the
primary purpose of interdicting enemy satellites in orbit by us-
ing the force of their own impact to destroy targets."0 One of
the most "conventional" forms of this is the use of missiles, such
as an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), to destroy enemy
satellites." However, the simplicity of missiles is overshadowed
by technical problems, such as an ineffective tracking system of
non-Earth targets. 2 The debris from the impact and explosion
would also be a concern for other U.S. military satellites in
nearby orbits.3
Boeing came up with a cleaner solution to the KE ASAT mis-
sile problem by putting forth the Killer Kinetic Vehicle (KV).
Classified as a defensive weapon system in Boeing's report on
the KV, it is supposed to launch and intercept the enemy satel-
lite while in orbit by using on-board cameras and propulsion.35
The system then deploys its "debris mitigation device (compara-
ble to a sail)," which catches the enemy satellite, disables it by
the impact, and then drags it into the atmosphere where both
burn upon reentry.36 This system thereby eliminates the prob-
of 3000 [kilometers]; a 30-MW laser with a 10-meter diameter mir-
ror in the same orbit and at the same range would take a more
reasonable 80 seconds .... For comparison, the entire flight of an
intercontinental ballistic missile, from launch to impact, would last
only about 45 minutes.
Id. at 5.
30 Id. at 6; Ramey, supra note 1, at 22.
3' DeBlois et al., supra note 29, at 6, 11.
32 ROCKETDYNE, ROCKWELL AEROSPACE, KINETIC ENERGY ANTI-SATELLITE PRO-
cRAm (KE ASAT) (1997), available at http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/
asat/brief9711/index.html. ICBMs have been historically meant for Earth
targets; gearing them to target satellites, according to Boeing, would be too ex-
pensive and a waste of resources, which could be cost effectively solved by imple-
menting its KE ASAT Killer Kinetic Vehicle (1V). Id. Of course, this report was
put out by a Boeing subsidiary in 1997 and was focused on selling the KV pro-
gram. See id. It also was a viable alternative since, in 1997, the United States was
still under the constraints of the ABM Treaty, which prevented the military from
implementing other options. See Perez-Rivas, supra note 19 (covering the an-
nouncement in 2001 that the United States would no longer be a party to the
treaty).
33 See ROCKETDYNE, supra note 32; Ramey, supra note 1, at 22.
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lem of debris created by the impact because the KV collects and
destroys it upon reentry. 17
Lockheed Martin launched something very similar in 1984,
when it created its Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) rocket,
which intercepted a mock missile warhead in space on approach
to a Pacific island lagoon during a simulated attack.38 When
launched, the HOE unfolded its umbrella-like skeleton, which
extended its radius to a "4.5 meter radial 'net"' with a nose sen-
sor in the center, and tracked the mock warhead. 9 The impact
speed of the HOE and its explosive payload make it a viable
weapon to target enemy satellites from both the ground and
space, provided a satellite is big enough to house such a missile
to protect itself from enemy attacks.40
One of the simplest KE ASAT weapons is the "[s] pace-to-space
missile," which is stationed in space. 41 However, these large pay-
loads could not be stationed on satellites but instead must be
"launched from ... orbiting carrier platform[s]."42 Such a plat-
form could hold multiple missiles capable of intercepting en-
emy missiles launched from Earth toward a satellite or against
attacks from enemy satellites.4 3 As with other missiles, a draw-
back to this method is that it would create space debris that
could potentially hit and destroy other nearby U.S. satellites, un-
less a KV or similar vehicle with a debris mitigation device is
used.44
Another KE ASAT weapon is the orbital space mine.45 The
principle is the same for mines used on Earth; they are
launched as non-maneuvering satellites that intersect with the
orbit of the enemy satellite and detonate when they are close
enough.4 6 Such detonations can contain explosives or deploy a
37 Id.; see Ramey, supra note 1, at 22.
"I Press Release, Lockheed Martin, Lockheed Martin Conducts Successful
PAC-3 Missile Test at White Sands Missile Range (Nov. 1, 2011), available at http:/
/www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/press-releases/201 1/november/LMCon-
ductsSuccessfulPac-3.html.
39 Ramey, supra note 1, at 22.
40 See id.
41 See WILSON, supra note 21, at 29.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See Ramey, supra note 1, at 22 (explaining that, although KE ASATs are "in-
tended to minimize" such debris, "a large quantity of resulting space debris" is
"normally associated with kinetic energy weapon impacts").




large quantity of smaller objects, "such as metal shot, sand, deb-
ris or ice particles," which would create "an artificial [E]arth-
orbiting ring" in the orbital path of the enemy satellite.47 These
objects would move fast enough to cause damage to the enemy
satellite despite their size; thus, the name for this "extension of
the [orbital] space mine concept" is the "fragmentation or pel-
let ring" ASAT.48 Both orbital space mines and pellet ring deto-
nations possibly "could be activated by command from [Elarth,
which could be triggered by, for example, reaction to heat or
mechanical action. ''4 These weapons, like missiles, create the
problem of space debris. 50 For instance, a pellet ring may
spread farther than intended and inadvertently destroy friendly
satellites. 51
Other types of KE ASAT weapons include the railgun and de-
pleted uranium rods.52 A railgun uses electromagnetic forces to
increase the velocity of hurled objects toward the enemy satel-
lites hundreds of miles out into space. 53 Hypervelocity rod bun-
dles are weaponized satellites that can use uranium or tungsten
rods.54 The use of depleted uranium rods is still in a conceptual
stage, but the general theory is that the depleted uranium rods
would be launched from a satellite platform and used remotely
as precision-guided missiles capable of "penetrat[ing] hundreds
of feet into the earth" due to the velocity gained upon reentry.55
The rods would require a propulsion system and shielding if
launched at Earth targets, but not if they were directed against
enemy satellites.56
C. NUCLEAR AND ELECTROMAGNETIC ASATs
Nuclear bombs in space create a different effect than on
Earth.5 ' Due to the lack of atmosphere in space, the usual de-
structive hallmarks associated with a nuclear blast, such as radio-
47 Id. at 29.
48 Id.
49 Ramey, supra note 1, at 27.
50 See WILSON, supra note 21, at 28-29.
51 See id.
2 See Ramey, supra note 1, at 22-23.
53 See id. at 22.
54 DeBlois et al., supra note 29, at 6. The hypervelocity rod bundles are also
commonly known as the "Rods from God." Id.
55 Ramey, supra note 1, at 23 (citing Ivan Bekey, Force Projection from Space, in
NEW WORLD VISTAS: AIR AND SPACE POWER FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 83, 84 (1995)).
56 See DeBlois et al., supra note 29, at 6.
57 See Ramey, supra note 1, at 19-20.
2012]
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active fallout, "shock waves, violent winds, and intense heat...
do not occur."58 What does occur is an electromagnetic pulse
(EMP) made up of gamma rays produced by the blast that cre-
ates an imbalance of electric currents (thereby disabling un-
shielded electronics) that is "100 times faster than lightning"
and "lasts only for a millionth of a second" upon hitting Earth's
atmosphere.59 What is most disturbing is that the higher the
blast is in space, the more ground-based targets and satellites are
affected by the EMP.6 ° The lethality of the effects of a nuclear
explosion extend even further because the beta particles and
the gamma rays "affect both radio waves and radar waves, impor-
tant to the functions of satellites."'6' There have been reports
that Russia has worked on developing an EMP ASAT, about
which there is very little information.6 2 The effects of such a
weapon would be catastrophic to non-hardened circuitry in
satellites and unprotected ground-based targets.63
D. RADio FREQUENCY ASATs
Another ASAT weapon is the radio frequency (RF) ASAT,
which uses "high RF ... power and large antennas. '"64 Combin-
ing these two elements creates a high concentration of electro-
magnetic radiation over ground-based targets that jam enemy
communications while allowing an attacker to broadcast misin-
formation over "even heavily shielded communications net-
works" with impunity.65 The U.S. Air Force submitted ASAT
plans to the Pentagon in November 2003, known as the "Trans-
formation Flight Plan," that detailed "a constellation of [RF]
satellites that would 'disrupt/destroy/disable a wide variety of
58 Id.
59 Id. at 20.
60 Id. To imagine the effects of the EMP, one need only to look to the James
Bond movie "GoldenEye," where there was a satellite that mimicked the effects of
a nuclear blast, but was able to focus the EMP at a ground-based target by way of a
narrow beam. See GOLDENEYE (Eon Productions 1995). If such a weapon existed,
it would be perhaps one of the most devastating weapons to mankind since we
are so dependent on technology. The EMP could erase computer records and
transactions, causing a political and economic meltdown. See Ramey, supra note
1, at 20.
61 Bourbonni4re, supra note 10, at 57.
62 Ramey, supra note 1, at 27 (citing B. Gertz & R. Scarborough, Russian ASA T,
WASH. TIMES, June 18, 1999, at 9).
63 See Bourbonniire, supra note 10, at 57.
64 Ramey, supra note 1, at 21 (quoting Bekey, supra note 55, at 84).
65 Id. (citing Bekey, supra note 55, at 84-85).
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electronics and national level command and control systems."' 66
The devastating effects of such a system would allow for misin-
formation or a propaganda campaign to be easily implemented
against an enemy on the battlefield.67
There are two types of RF ASATs: ultrawideband (UJWB) and
high power microwave (HPM) weapons.68 UWB ASATs have "a
wide frequency spectrum" that results in less dense RF radiation
doses and less focused attacks on enemy satellites.69 When
aimed at an enemy satellite, a JWAB ASAT can "cause major
damage to the satellite's internal communication hardware" or
just "cause [a] system upset, which may persist only while the
target is being irradiated .... -7 HPM ASAT weapons have a
much narrower frequency that allows them to be concentrated
and focused so they can more easily overwhelm electric compo-
nents through cracks and openings in satellites.7' The main
components of RF ASATs must include a power supply large
enough to send the frequency, an antenna to direct the radia-
tion, and a way to target and evaluate the hit on the enemy
72
E. PARTICLE BEAM ASATs
Particle beams are space-based weapons that fire "atomic par-
ticles, such as negative hydrogen or deuterium ions" in high
concentrations toward enemy targets. 73  These weapons
"radiat[e] enough energy to overload the satellite's internal
electronics. ''7 They must be used in space because the "parti-
cles cannot penetrate the atmosphere," and the satellite must
have both a large enough power supply and an adequate cool-
66 Jeremy Singer, Air Force Document Envisions Variety of Anti-Satellite Weapons,
SPACE NEWS (Feb. 23, 2004), http://,Aw.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/04
0223-asat-weapons.htm. Note that this article does mention the difficulty in de-
termining which of these programs in the Transformation Flight Plan were just
ideas on computers and which actually existed. Id.
67 See id.; Ramey, supra note 1, at 21.
68 WILSON, supra note 21, at 34.
69 Id.
70 Id. The radiation reaches the internal hardware "through the satellite's an-
tenna" and "through openings in [its] shielding." Id.
71 Id. The frequency ranges from 100 MHz to 100 GHz as compared to the
wider UWB frequency, which ranges "from about 100 MHz to more than 1 GHz."
Id.
72 Id. at 35.
73 Id. at 36.
74 Id.
2012]
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ing system to deal with "the heat surge generated by the weapon
and its power supply."75
F. MICROSAT AND NANOSAT ASATs
Micro-satellites (microsats) and nano-satellites (nanosats) are
"[e]xamples of the [p]roliferation of [l]ong-[d]uration-orbital
[i]nterceptor [t]echnology" because they can be made cheaply
with high-grade technology and sent into space by nearly any
willing country for a long period of time before activation.76
Microsats can range from 10 to 100 kilograms7 7 and can be
launched "from anywhere in [a] country," because their small
size makes them extremely hard to track as they enter orbit.78
The satellite would "include [ ] a GPS receiver" to enable orbital
stabilization and a "multi-spectral camera" for image resolu-
tion.79 Additionally, thanks to advances in miniaturizing tech-
nology, microsats can perform the same functions as regular-
sized satellites, such as inspection and imaging, and can even be
programmed to covertly "fly alongside a target until com-
manded to disrupt, and then disable or destroy the target."8°
Thus, such weapons allow for the element of surprise and
deniability.
Nanosats are even smaller than microsats, weighing anywhere
from one to ten kilograms.8' Nanosats are both cheaper to
build and lighter to launch, resulting in more launches and the
ability to be easily hidden in legally-registered payloads sent into
space until they are commanded from a ground control center
to separate and attack target satellites.82  The nanosat,
codenamed "parasitic satellite" by the Chinese because it can at-
tach to an enemy satellite, is designed to lay dormant until a
conflict, when it is activated from Earth to "interfere [with] or
75 Id. at 36-37.
76 Id. at 29-30.
77 Id.
78 Adams & France, supra note 5, at 20 (quoting Philippe Cosyn, China Plans
Rapid-Response, Mobile Rocket, Nanosatellite Next Year, SPACE DAILY (May 1, 2001),
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-01zc.html) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
79 Id.
go WILSON, supra note 21, at 30.
81 Adams & France, supra note 5, at 20.
82 Id. This is known as "piggyback[ing]." Id. Nanosats cost "between 0.1 and
1.0 percent of a typical satellite," making them viable and dangerous weapons.
WILSON, supra note 21, at 31.
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destroy the host satellite." 3 Nanosats "must be very small to
conceal their existence and avoid interfering [with] the normal
operation of the host satellites" during this dormancy.84 Thus,
like with microsats, the nanosat's small size allows for deniability
after an attack.
III. SPACE LAW TREATIES AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE
UNITED NATIONS' CHARTER
A. THE RELEVANCE OF THE ICJ IN SPACE LAW ANALYsis
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ Statute) is the best place to start framing a legal argument
on the rules of engagement for weaponized satellites.85 Article
38 creates a framework in which the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) must examine an issue in the forum of international
law.8 6 There are four factors to consider when dealing with mat-
ters of international law:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.8 7
The first factor recognizes that states are bound by conventions
if they "expressly recognize [ ]" them. 8 The second factor deals
with customary international law, also known as state practice.89
This is what the bulk of the analysis will center on because state
practice, the little that does exist in space law, was codified in
the space law treaties.90 The third factor recognizes the general
principles that states recognize, which are also framed in the
. Cheng Ho, China Eyes Anti-Satellite System, SPACE DAILY (Jan. 8, 2001), http://
www.spacedaily.com/news/china-0 lc.html.
84 Id.
85 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
86 See id. The International Court of Justice is a U.N.-established court that
uses Article 38 of the ICJ Statute to guide its decisions. Id. arts. 1, 38.
87 Id. art. 38, 1 (a)-(d).
88 Id. art. 38, 1(a).
89 Id. art. 38, 1(b).
90 See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. III.
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space law treaties, where they reference being bound by interna-
tional law and the U.N. Charter.9 Finally, the fourth factor fur-
ther broadens the understanding of international issues by
allowing the ICJ to look to international jurists on a specific
topic,92 giving relevance to law review articles and books in the
applicable field-here, weaponized satellites in space.
B. THE OUTER SPACE TiuATy
Upon entering into force in 1967, the multilateral Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) became the foundation of
space law because it was the first treaty to deal with the issue of
outer space." Article III lays out that states must follow "inter-
national law, including the Charter of the United Nations
.... "94 International norms used on Earth are thus extended to
outer space. One of the overarching themes of the treaty is that
all outer space exploration "shall be the province of all man-
kind. 9 5 Article I also mentions how such exploration of space is
meant to "encourage international co-operation . "...96
The Outer Space Treaty interpretation was a battle between
those who advocated for non-military use of space and those
who advocated for non-aggressive use.97 The United States ad-
vocated for the non-aggressive view in an effort to protect its
reconnaissance satellites, arguing that the satellites help by "lim-
iting the chance of accidental war or surprise attack."98 The
United States' non-aggressive interpretation of the Outer Space
Treaty would extend to weaponized satellites, which are not ex-
pressly mentioned, while the stricter non-military interpretation
91 ICJ Statute, supra note 85, art. 38, 1(c). Examples include reoccurring
clauses in the space law treaties, such as those from the Outer Space Treaty,
which is discussed later: "province of all mankind," "free for exploration and use
by all States," and "international co-operation." Outer Space Treaty, supra note
11, arts. I, III.
92 ICJ Statute, supra note 85, art. 38, 1 (d). Article 59, which states that "[t] he
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case," is not part of this article's analysis of weaponized
satellites. See id. art. 59.
93 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.
94 Id. art. III.
95 See id. art. I.
96 Id.
97 NATHAN C. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC




would not. 9 The non-aggressive interpretation would find the
outer limits to weaponized satellites in Article IV, which prohib-
its "objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weap-
ons of mass destruction .. ". ."I" The prohibition of these
weapons in orbit or any form of stationing around Earth means
that satellites cannot be equipped with nuclear weapons, such as
nuclear warheads.
The more ambiguous term of "any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction" poses more of a problem. 10 1 Does this apply
to weapons with high destructive capability comparable to nu-
clear weapons or to weapons that can destroy anything from
space? The Outer Space Treaty does not deal with this distinc-
tion, and it seems that only weapons of a destructive capacity
similar to nuclear weapons were envisioned by the treaty's cre-
ators during the height of the Cold War in 1967.102
What is more troubling is that the Outer Space Treaty restricts
a state from shooting down other states' satellites with a ground-
based attack, but is silent about satellites attacking ground-based
targets. 03 Article VII states that any country "that launches .. .
an object into space . . . is internationally liable for damage to
another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical
persons by such object or its component parts on Earth .... ""
The brevity of Article VII belies its importance, especially in
light of a recent event in which China successfully shot down its
own weather satellite with a ballistic missile on January 11, 2007,
and blinded a U.S. military satellite in September 2006.0-' This
flexing of China's muscles was legal because it shot down one of
its own satellites and the laser was not a launch; however, if it
had shot down a satellite of another state with the missile, that
would have been illegal under Article VII and could have been a
99 Id.; see Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11.
100 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. IV. Nuclear weapons are not only
prohibited from being stationed in space, but testing them there is also prohib-
ited by the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water. See Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the At-
mosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water art. 1, Aug. 8, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313,
480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1963).
101 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. IV.
102 See id. Looking strictly at the text of the treaty, launching any form of non-
nuclear attack from weaponized satellites, whether defensive or offensive, is legal.
See id.
103 See id. art. VII.
104 Id.
105 See Analysts Say U.S. Working on Array of Satellite Defenses, supra note 20.
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reason for war."°6 This liability clause elevates the status of satel-
lites from mere objects in space to pieces of sovereign territory
of a country. 1 7 A state's satellites in space now have the same
inherent rights and obligations as military ships at sea, where
acts of aggression between two such ships could be provocation
for war.10 8
The Article VII prohibition does not distinguish between
commercial and governmental satellites, though it is highly
doubtful that governments would seek to destroy another na-
tion's commercial satellites given the interwoven nature of
globalization.0 9 When dealing with military satellites, Article
VII prohibits any objects from being launched at another state's
satellite, but any other attack is implicitly allowed." 0  The
MIRACL laser and the Chinese version of the laser launch no
objects into space, yet they have the capability to destroy satel-
lites."' As of now, this is allowed.'1 2 Lasers only use chemical
reactions to produce focused light energy against their target, so
no objects are launched in this process; this is legal from a
ground-based position and unquestionably legal from a space-
based position." 3 The treaty seems to only prohibit launches
which go directly from Earth to an enemy satellite. Under this
reasoning, attacks with any laser system are allowed, as are space
mines, including the pellet ring version, since they must posi-
tion themselves in space rather than immediately seek and de-
stroy enemy satellites after launches." 4 The KE ASATs that are
prohibited include the HOE rockets (if launched from Earth),
railguns, and ICBM missiles because they are physical objects
that require launching from Earth." 5 Attacks from space of any
kind are not expressly prohibited, so they are implicitly al-
lowed." 6 This means weaponized satellites equipped with la-
106 See id.; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. VII.
107 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. VII.
108 See Tannenwald, supra note 8, at 374.
109 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. VII.
110 See id.
111 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
112 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. VII.
113 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text; Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 11, art. VII. Again, the difference between offensive and defensive weapons
is blurred because both space-based and ground-based lasers can be used in both
fashions. See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 17-29, 45-49 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 31, 38-40, 53 and accompanying text.
116 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. VII.
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sers, missile platforms (even missiles equipped with KVs),
hypervelocity rod bundles, particle beams, or radio frequency
blasts are legal.
The 1978 U.N. Conference of the Committee on Disarma-
ment redefined weapons of mass destruction to include
"[b]iological, radiological, chemical and similar weapons ... ;
however, the definition did not as clearly include laser, weather
modification, and antisatellite weapons."'1 17 The reason for this
purposeful ambiguity can be best explained by the Soviets'
change of position regarding space as a demilitarized zone. The
Soviets first advocated a non-military stance on the Outer Space
Treaty, but "they began to shift their position" as they launched
"military satellites and tested [ASAT] weapons.""'  Possibly
aware of the implications of restraining their own military tech-
nologies, perhaps the United States made sure that the terms of
the treaty allowed for enough clever maneuvering. On the
other hand, lasers and other non-nuclear weapons are seen by
some scholars to offend "the spirit of the treaty," most notably
the "benefit and province of all mankind" clause in Article I."'
While the treaty expressly prohibits nuclear weapons, there is a
debate among scholars as to whether lasers should be classified
as nuclear weapons if they "are triggered by a nuclear reaction,"
and whether particle beams are illegal "because the charged
particles are atomic.' ' 20
By this same logic, the hypervelocity rod bundles also raise the
question of what constitutes a nuclear bomb.121 The rods in it
are depleted uranium, which is found in many dirty nuclear
bombs. 12 2 So, would these rods raining down from the sky be
the same as miniature dirty bombs? It is hard to say since the
effects of the radiation read-outs from a target after being hit by
one of these rods have not been made public. 23 With more in-
formation, we could better decide if the damage and radiation
117 GOLDMAN, supra note 97, at 96.
118 Id.
119 Id.; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 11, art. I ("The exploration and use of
outer space ... shall be carried out for the benefit ... of all countries .. .and
shall be the province of all mankind.").
120 GOLDMAN, supra note 97, at 96-97. Goldman agrees with the theory that if a
laser is powered by a nuclear reaction, then it is a nuclear weapon. The scholars
he agrees with are R.J. Zedalis and C.L. Wade. See id.
121 See id.
122 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
123 See id. (noting that the development of these rods is still "in a conceptual
phase").
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were great enough to classify it as a nuclear bomb. And if it
were, then the weapon could not be used even against enemy
satellites from space-based ASATs.
C. THE LIABILITY CONVENTION
The Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention) entered into
force in 1972.124 As its name suggests, the Liability Convention
deals with liability issues between states for damages caused by
space objects. 125 This convention represents an important limi-
tation on weaponized satellite rules of engagement because it
puts penalties on space warfare. 26 While weaponized satellites
are not expressly mentioned in the convention, they could fall
under the definition of "component parts of a space object,"
and damage caused by them could include the "loss of life, per-
sonal injury .. .or loss of or damage to property of States
.... "127 Satellites can be classified only as space objects because
the convention concerns launched space objects.
While the Liability Convention places an emphasis on the use
of international law as a way to solve these space-related
problems, it does not touch on the possibility of war between
two countries. 128 Additionally, under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter, a state's right to self-defense could be invoked asjustifi-
cation for retaliating. 129
D. THE RESCUE AND RETURN AGREEMENT
The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space (Rescue and Return Agreement) entered into force in
1968.130 This agreement has a narrower focus than the two
space treaties previously discussed because it concerns the res-
cue of astronauts and recovery of space objects that crash on
Earth.' The latter part of the treaty mostly concerns satel-
lites.13 2 Under Article 5, a signing party has authority over a
124 See Liability Convention, supra note 11.
125 Id,
126 See id.
127 Id. art. 1.
128 See id. arts. I-XXVIII.
129 See U.N. Charter art. 51.
130 See Rescue and Return Agreement, supra note 11.
131 Id.
132 See id. arts. 5-6.
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downed space object if it is discovered in the signing party's ter-
ritory. 133 However, the agreement imposes a duty on the discov-
ering state when the launching state requests help to recover the
downed space object.13 4 The Rescue and Return Agreement
does not impact satellite warfare except in the recovery of the
shot-down satellites, provided there is enough material to
salvage. 135
E. THE REGISTRATION CONVENTION
The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into
Outer Space (Registration Convention) entered into force in
1976. I36 In an effort to create a system to identify space objects,
including satellites, the Registration Convention mandates that
a launching nation notify the Secretary-General of the U.N. of
each launched space object.13 7 The register of this information
is kept by the U.N. so that there is "full and open" access to the
information. 138 The launching state is to provide a "designator
of the space object" along with the "orbital parameters" of the
object. 139 Despite attempting to promote transparency, the Re-
gistration Convention suffers from a lack of compliance, espe-
cially with respect to satellites that serve a military function. 4 '
F. THE MOON TREATY
The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty) entered into
force in 1984.141 However, the United States, Russia, and China
are not parties to this treaty because they never ratified it.142
The Moon Treaty was created to organize and promote explora-
133 Id. art. 5, 2.
134 Id.
135 See id.
136 See Registration Convention, supra note 11.
137 Id. art. II, 1.
138 Id. art. III, 1-2.
139 Id. art. IV, 1 (b), 1(d).
140 COLLARD-WEXLER ET AL., supra note 25, at 24-25. "For example, by 2001,
the [United States] had failed to register 141 of its over 2,000 satellite payloads.
To date, not one of the satellites registered has ever been described as having a
military function." Id. at 25.
141 See Moon Treaty, supra note 11; U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS,
AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CE-
LESTIAL BODIES (2012), available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/Space
Law/moon.html.
142 U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, supra note 141.
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tion and use of the Moon among all states.' 43 Just as with the
Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty extends international law
and the U.N. Charter to the Moon.' 44 Similar to the language of
the Outer Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty declares the Moon to
"be the province of all mankind," and that all activities on the
Moon are to be "for the benefit and in the interests of all coun-
tries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific devel-
opment." 145 The treaty goes even further to create "an
international regime . . . to govern the exploitation . .. of the
Moon.' 46
Under this treaty, the Moon is classified as a demilitarized
zone much as it was in the Outer Space Treaty; however, an en-
tire article is devoted to this, expressly prohibiting "hostile act[s]
or threat[s] of hostile act[s] on the Moon . . ,,.47 Moreover,
this article even prohibits "[t] he establishment of military bases,
installations and fortification, the testing of any type of weapons
and the conduct of military [maneuvers] on the Moon .... 48
G. U.N. CHARTER ARTICLE 51
Treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon Treaty
expressly invoke the U.N. Charter as their guiding principle, so
it is important to look at the Charter to note any constraints on
U.S. military satellites.'49 Article 51 is most important for under-
standing the limitations on weaponized satellites, stating:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Coun-
cil has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Secur-
ity Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and re-
sponsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
143 Moon Treaty, supra note 11, pmbl.
144 See generally id.
145 Id. art. 4, 1.
146 Id. art. 11, 5. This and Article 4, Paragraph 1 are the main reasons that
economically powerful countries have not signed the treaty (i.e., the treaty does
not allow for military or commercial exploitation of the Moon).
147 Id. art. 3.
148 Id. art. 3, 4.




take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security. 150
The right to self-defense is a key reason why weaponized satel-
lites have become an important component of the U.S. military
and militaries of other states as well. This has recently taken on
a new meaning with China's advances in ASAT technology.15 1
Article 51 codifies the right of states to defend themselves;
however, it "does not preclude the lawfulness of such devices as
contiguous zones for security."152 Locations of weaponized satel-
lites could be classified as these "contiguous zones of security"
because they can both protect themselves and retaliate against
enemy targets on Earth or in space. 51 If a state does not violate
Article 4 of the U.N. Charter by threatening or using force
against "the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state," 151 then the existence of weaponized satellites is permissi-
ble. 1 55 Their existence in space is analogous to a naval force in a
time of peace because, while navy ships are weapons, they are
allowed to sail on the high seas when not at war.156 If war did
break out between the United States and a space-faring nation,
then attacks by U.S. weaponized satellites would be justified
under the self-defense doctrine.
57
IV. HISTORY OF THE LAW OF THE SEA
Many writers have compared the use of space to the explora-
tion of the New World.'5 It was during this time period in the
seventeenth century that the law of the high seas first took shape
in Hugo Grotius's 1609 work, Mare Liberum1 59 In his work, Gro-
tius wrote that a country must possess or be able to occupy an
object in order to claim it as property. 60 Additionally, if an ob-
'5,' U.N. Charter art. 51.
15, See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
152 LEON LIPSON & NICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH, REPORT TO THE NATIONAL AER-
ONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 25 (Am. Bar
Found. 1961). This report is interesting because many of the issues discussed in
it were later embodied in the space law treaties. See id.
153 See id.
154 U.N. Charter art. 2, 4.
155 See LiPSON & KATZENBACH, supra note 152, at 25.
156 Id. at 26.
157 See U.N. Charter art. 51; LIPSON & KATZENBACH, supra note 152, at 25.
11s Jonathan C. Thomas, Spatialis Liberum, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 579, 582
(2006).
15, Id. at 583.
1(o Id. at 595.
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ject is provided by nature for all men, then it must be for the
common use of man, notjust for the use of one man.161 Being a
Dutchman during the Age of Discovery, Grotius needed to advo-
cate for freedom of the seas to justify Dutch colonization efforts
and to explain why the Spanish and Portuguese could not lay
claim to the seas due to their powerful navies. 6 2 Interestingly,
to better illustrate his point, Grotius analogized the seas to the
skies:
But the poet uses "public" in its usual meaning, not those things
which belong to any one people, but to human society as a
whole; that is to say, things which are called "public" are, accord-
ing to the [I]aws of the law of nations, the common property of
all, and the private property of none. The air belongs to this
class of things for two reasons: First, it is not susceptible of occu-
pation; and second its common use is destined for all men. For
the same reasons the sea is common to all, because it is so limit-
less that it cannot become a possession of anyone, and because it
is adapted for the use of all, whether we consider it from the
point of view of navigation or of fisheries. 6 '
Grotius's "freedom of the seas" principle gained traction
when Great Britain embraced the principle "after the Napole-
onic wars."' 6 4 As time went by and more nations took advantage
of this principle, pollution and over-fishing became serious con-
cerns that eventually led to the Law of the Sea Convention in
1982. 165
The Law of the Sea Convention separates the seas into four
territories: (1) "the territorial sea"; (2) "the contiguous zone";
(3) the "exclusive economic zone"; and (4) "the high seas.' '1 6 6
Each country's "territorial sea" extends twelve nautical miles
from the shoreline of that country.1 67 The "contiguous zone" is
a body of water "contiguous to [a country's] territorial sea" that
extends only twenty-four nautical miles from the shore of the
country. 168 In this area, the coastal state is allowed to "exercise
161 Id. at 595-96.
162 Id. at 598.
'6-1 Id. at 595.
164 Tannenwald, supra note 8, at 392. The reason for this shift in British think-
ing, which had previously advocated for a "closed sea," was because the freedom
of the high seas meant more opportunity for free trade during the Industrial Age.
Id. at 391-92.
165 Id. at 393.
166 Thomas, supra note 158, at 606.
167 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, arts. 3-4.
168 Id. art. 33.
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the control necessary to: (a) prevent infringement of its cus-
toms, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within
its territory or territorial sea"; and "(b) punish infringement of
the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or
territorial sea."'169 The "exclusive economic zone" extends 200
nautical miles from the shoreline 7 ' and is contiguous with the
territorial sea of the coastal state.' 7 ' In this zone, the coastal
state has the exclusive "rights of exploring and exploiting . . .
the natural resources" within the area. 17 2 The final zone is the
high seas, which is everything not between the coast and the
exclusive economic zone; 7 ' it is "open to all States, whether
coastal or land-locked."' 74 This final zone is where Grotius's
freedom of the high seas principle was codified. 75
V. HOW THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
COULD BE APPLIED TO SPACE
The problem of trying to analogize satellites to objects that fit
in the Law of the Sea Convention is very much like trying to fit a
square peg in a round hole. One of the problems is how to
classify outer space into various zones like the seas on Earth.
Jonathan C. Thomas attempts just this in his law review arti-
cle. 176 He measures these zones outward from the surface of
Earth, similar to how the Law of the Sea Convention measures
the zones from the coast of the coastal state. 77 The zones he
comes up with are: "territorial space, contiguous space, and
transitory space."78 "Territorial space" extends from Earth's
surface to the exosphere, which is 960 kilometers from the
169 Id.
170 Id. art. 57.
171 Id. art. 55.
172 Id. art. 56, 1(a).
173 Id. art. 86.
174 Id. art. 87, 1.
175 See id., art. 87 (entitled, "Freedom of the high seas").
176 Thomas, supra note 158, at 606-10.
177 Id. at 607-08. Thomas describes a formula for determining a ratio of the
territorial space zone "[b]y dividing Earth's diameter into the distance of the exo-
sphere" (12,756.3km/960 km). Id. at 608. The resulting number (13.2879125)
would then be divided into the diameter of any other planet and the resulting
number would then be how high that planet's territorial space zone starts. Id.
The resulting formula would be x = 13.2878125/a planet's diameter. Id. Thomas
believes that this would provide an accurate ratio. Id. The formula would be the
same for calculating the other space zones for other planets. Id.
178 Id. at 607.
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planet's surface. 179 At this limit, territorial space "is limited
enough to allow free passage of outer space vessels in transitory
space, but allows sufficient space for Earth's inhabitants to use
orbital appropriation activities . . . ."'0 "Contiguous space" is
double the size of territorial space, so Earth's contiguous space
would be from 960 kilometers to 1,920 kilometers in relation to
Earth's surface.""' This is for "a pre-entry buffer zone between
transitory space and territorial space."' 182 There is no compara-
ble "exclusive economic zone" in space because Thomas be-
lieves it would be contrary to the idea of his spatialis liberum (free
space) .183 The next zone is "transitory space," which would en-
compass all of outer space not between Earth's surface and con-
tiguous space.18 4 This transitory zone is the equivalent of the
high seas. 1"
The problem with Thomas's analogy is that it limits satellite
use to territorial space.' 86 His analysis focuses on spaceships
rather than satellites.'8 7 As a result, his use of the Law of the Sea
Convention would follow Article 17, which defines innocent pas-
sage of ships applying to all nations.188 He also uses the defini-
tions in Article 19, which defines innocent passage of foreign
ships as not "prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal State."' 89 According to Article 19, ships do not meet
this definition if they use "any threat or use of force against the
sovereignty... of the coastal State 9° . . . any exercise or prac-
tice with weapons of any kind,' 9' ... the carrying out of research
or survey activities, 92 . . . [or] any act aimed at interfering with
any systems of communication or any other facilities or installa-
tions of the coastal State ... ,191 For Thomas, any activities that
"have an adverse effect on a state" should not be allowed in terri-
179 Id. at 607-08.
180 Id. at 609.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 609-10.
184 Id. at 610.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 609.
187 See generally id.
188 See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art. 17.
189 Id. art. 19, 2.
190 Id. art. 19, 2(a).
191 Id. art. 19, 2(b).
192 Id. art. 19, 2(j).
193 Id. art. 19, 2(k).
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torial space.' 94 According to this application of the Law of the
Sea Convention to space, only commercial satellites would be
allowed in this area. 19
5
Military satellites would not be allowed within territorial space
because even military communication satellites could be consid-
ered adverse to another state since they may help to coordinate
actions against the target state on Earth.'96 Spy satellites would
not be allowed in this space zone because their purpose would
be to conduct surveillance of other states. 9 7 Additionally,
weaponized satellites, ranging from nano-satellites to satellites
equipped with lasers, would be outlawed because their purpose
is to take out ground-based targets or other satellites. 9 8 It
would also be illegal to place such satellites directly over a target
state because this could be seen as conducting research and sur-
veillance.1 9 On the high seas, ships conducting spy missions
cannot enter the territorial waters of the target state because it is
not innocent passage.2 0
0
While Thomas's space regime is idealistic, it is far from per-
fect and would require an international board of space trade to
monitor space, much like how the International Seabed Author-
ity deals with polymetallic nodules by "organiz[ing] and con-
trol[ling] all mineral-related activities in the international
seabed area beyond the jurisdiction of any State, an area under-
lying most of the world's oceans."'20 ' This is unlikely to happen
because the space-faring nations of the world would cede their
space dominance if they ever agreed to such an authority. The
only way for an international space regime to actually exist
would be to provide a system of rules of engagement, specifically
for satellites in the short-term, and work toward the long-term
solution of applying the Law of the Sea Convention to satellites.
194 Thomas, supra note 158, at 612.
195 See id.; Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art. 19.
196 See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art. 19, 2(a).
197 See id. art. 19, 2(j).
198 See id. art. 19, 2(a)-(b).
IS) See id. art. 19, 1 2(j).
200 See id. art. 19.
201 Bezpalko, supra note 14, at 885-86. Polymetallic nodules are iron ore de-
posits on the surface of the deep seabed that are composed of the iron ores
manganese, "iron, silicon, nickel, copper, and cobalt." Id. at 877.
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VI. HOW TO CREATE A SPACE REGIME
FOR SPACE SATELLITES
If the Law of the Sea Convention is to be applied to space in
any form, states will need to have a system for settling satellite
conflicts. Is the answer found in trying to analogize satellites to
the "ships" under the Law of the Sea Convention, or can the
answer be found by examining fishing cases brought before the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea? By evaluating
each situation, an answer may be unearthed regarding how to
deal with space satellites when applying an adapted Law of the
Sea Convention to space.
A. THE DEFINITION OF SHIPS UNDER THE
LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION
Under the Law of the Sea Convention, "[e]very State, whether
coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships flying its flag on
the high seas. '20 2 To help identify the ships, every state shall
establish its own method for registering ships of its nationality
and allow such ships to fly the state's flag.203 The flag state must
also maintain jurisdictional control over its ships and maintain
records of those registered ships.20 4 Violations of a ship belong-
ing to another flag state shall be reported to that ship's flag
state, and "[t]he flag State and the other State shall co-operate
in the conduct of any inquiry held by that other State into any
such marine casualty or incident of navigation. '' 20 5 In the event
of a flag state ship colliding or becoming involved in an "inci-
dent of navigation" with a non-flag state ship, only the flag state
can institute a penal or disciplinary action for the flag state's
ship.2 ° 6 Warships "have complete immunity from ... any State
other than the flag State. 20 7
If the Law of the Sea Convention is applied to space, a satellite
would not be classified as a "ship" because it is not operated by
persons aboard it. The definition of "ship" is not expressly
stated in the definition section of the convention, but it does
imply that a ship must have persons aboard it. For example, in
Article 97, only the flag state can impose any penal or discipli-
202 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art. 90.
203 Id. art. 91, 1 1.
204 Id. art. 91, 2; id. art. 94, 1-2.
205 Id. art. 94, 6, 7.
206 Id. art. 97, 1.
207 Id. art. 95.
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nary proceedings on the "master or... any other person in the
service of the ship .... 208
Despite the fact that the person requirement is the biggest
difference between ships and satellites, there are some notewor-
thy analogies from which to draw. Satellite states, like flag states,
must register the launch of objects into space to provide "full
and open access to the information. '"209 However, this does not
prevent a satellite state from launching unregistered military
and spy satellites. Similar to "warships" on the high seas, mili-
tary and spy satellites would enjoy an exempt status. Analogous
to the definition of "warships," any confrontation between satel-
lite states regarding military or spy satellites would not be pro-
hibited; thus, there is the potential for an ASAT weapons arms
race. Such a military escalation could lead to space becoming
the tinderbox for the next world war.
B. THE SWORDFISH CASES AND THE SPACE COURT
Looking at how the world has dealt with the issue of fisheries
may offer the best template for settling satellite confrontations
in space. The Law of the Sea Convention has dispute resolution
provisions to address issues that arise between states.210 Article
279 mandates that states use peaceful means to settle dis-
putes, 211 while Article 280 allows the states to choose their own
means of settling disputes.21 2 If the parties choose a way to settle
the dispute,2 13 it shall be in place of the convention's arbitration
clause, which is triggered when both sides cannot agree on the
same procedure.214 Many disputes have successfully been de-
cided by international commissions,215 much like the ones set
up by the Law of the Sea Convention: "the International Court
of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, an
international arbitral tribunal and a special technical arbitral
tribunal. 2 16
One group of cases that went before the International Tribu-
nal for the Law of the Sea (Tribunal) deserves attention-the
208 Id. art. 97, 1.
209 Registration Convention, supra note 11, arts. II-11.
210 See Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, pt. XV.
211 Id. art. 279.
212 Id. art. 280.
213 Id. art. 282.
214 Id. art. 287, 5.
215 Bezpalko, supra note 14, at 895.
216 Id.; Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 13, art. 287, (1) (a)-(d).
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Swordfish Cases.217 The dispute involved the hunting of swordfish
over the Nazca Ridge in the southeast Pacific Ocean by Euro-
pean Union (EU) fishers. 218 In response, Chile enacted legisla-
tion concerning the conservation of swordfish in its exclusive
economic zone and the nearby high seas due to the migratory
nature of the swordfish.21 9 Chile also prohibited the use of its
ports to any ships that violated these laws (i.e., the EU fishing
ships).22 The problem eventually went before the Tribunal
when both Chile and the EU agreed to it.221 The Tribunal grap-
pled with the duty of a state to respect another state's fishing
rights under the Law of the Sea Convention and the question of
whether Chile could exercise control beyond its exclusive eco-
nomic zone into the high seas.222 Before a decision was
reached, Chile and the EU reached a bilateral agreement resolv-
ing the matter. 223 As Ian Bezpalko points out in his article, en-
forcing the Law of the Sea Convention is difficult even if the
parties agree to the same type of dispute resolution process be-
cause there is no mandatory court with the jurisdictional ability
to hear disputes, enforce decisions, and sanction a losing state
regarding the Law of the Sea Convention.224
Bezpalko's analysis of the Swordfish Cases reveals a weakness
that must be resolved if the Law of the Sea Convention is to be
successfully implemented as the law of space.2 25 The answer is a
Law of Space Convention with the judicial apparatus of a
mandatory court (administered by the U.N. for legitimacy) with
jurisdiction to hear disputes if belligerent space-faring states
cannot choose a way to settle the dispute first. This space court
would also serve as a way to avoid war if a settlement could not
be reached. Its mere existence would serve as a deterrent to
aggression and lead to satellite states making ASATs of a defen-
sive nature to both discourage attacks and avoid unfavorable
space court rulings. The space court's decisions would also re-
solve disputes over time by creating a body of common law that
continuously evolves as the technology does and gives guidance
217 See Bezpalko, supra note 14, at 896-900.
218 Id. at 896.
219 Id. at 896-97.
220 Id. at 897.
221 Id. at 898-99.
222 Id. at 899.





to states interacting with each other in space. This method
would be much faster than rewriting and re-signing space trea-
ties so as to keep up with technology. Additionally, the court's
existence would help to eliminate the "warship" problem by pro-
viding an incentive not to destroy another state's military or spy
satellites. This is the best practical solution for establishing a set
of laws for military and spy satellites within a legal framework
analogous to the Law of the Sea Convention.
To make this framework more practical, the court's jurisdic-
tion could be widened to encompass both spaceships and satel-
lites. In light of the recent privatization of space transport in
the United States, it would be advantageous to extend the
court's jurisdiction to these budding but ever-growing fleets of
spaceships before any future problems arise.
VII. CONCLUSION
If the Law of the Sea Convention was applied to space as it
currently is, military and spy space satellites would not success-
fully fit within its framework. Defining space satellites as ships is
problematic because ships require persons aboard them, and
defining satellites as warships presents an immunity problem
that allows for the unchecked destruction of enemy satellites.
Additionally, defining satellites as warships could create an
ASAT weapons arms race that might eventually create a powder
keg for the next world war.
The best way to avoid this problem is to learn from the Inter-
national Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and make an analogous
court for military and spy satellites-the space court. This adju-
dicative body would have mandatory jurisdiction over any con-
flict involving military and spy satellites between countries, and
it would also serve as a deterrent to any possible ASAT wars.
This space court, with a version of the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion reconfigured for space, would provide a practical frame-
work for resolving conflicts between satellite states short of war.
The biggest obstacle to this problem is getting all nations, es-
pecially space-faring ones, to sign on to a Law of Space Conven-
tion and the space court. For both the United States and China,
such a move would restrict their space programs; therefore, it
appears unlikely that the two countries would agree to such le-
gal restrictions.
It is more likely that once both states are technologically
matched in space, they would agree to the convention and the
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court. Only when these two powerful countries become signato-
ries to a Law of Space Convention would the space court be-
come an effective tool at preventing future satellite-related
conflicts. Until then, the intention of this article is to give some
clarity as to how different technologies fit under the current
space law treaties, and what the basic framework for the rules of
engagement by U.S. satellites should look like in order to lessen
the chances of a war triggered in space.
